1. Introduction {#sec0001}
===============

There are two reports related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak paving the way for this paper since the outbreak has caused a crisis for the global markets. [@bib0004] reports that the significantly increased global volatility due to the COVID-19 outbreak can adversely affect the prospects for a global recovery. [@bib0009] report that the immediate impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the global economy is inevitable. However, this COVID-19 outbreak does not harm all of the business opportunities. The life insurance business is a new business opportunity since people\'s awareness of life and health has been enhanced and then stimulate demand for life and health insurance. We extend the reports by examining the impacts of the COVID-19 and capital regulation on the insurer\'s optimal guaranteed rate and the board\'s utility, which imply possible interest conflicts between the insurer and its board.

We focus on the COVID-19 for reasons. First, the outbreak of the COVID-19 is now the most significant Black Swan of 2020 ([@bib0004]). [@bib0013] point out that the COVID-19 outbreak has significant impacts on the global financial markets and creates substantial volatility. Second, the risks the insurer faces are more evenly spread between the two sides of the balance sheet. Thus, asset-liability matching under capital regulation is a crucial issue from the standpoint of insurance stability ([@bib0007]). Third, we consider the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak and capital regulation on the optimal guaranteed rate-setting behavior and the board utility, possibly revealing conflicts of incentives. The recent literature remains silent on this issue.

In this paper, a model exploring the COVID-19 outbreak is proposed. For that purpose, a form of a structural break in volatility is introduced to evaluate the insurer\'s equity value in a contingent claim model. The model also formulates the board utility to study the issue of interest conflicts. Moreover, deriving the comparative statics presents intuition and application in the paper.

2. Framework model {#sec0002}
==================

Consider the insurer who makes all financial decisions during a period horizon, *t* ∈ \[0, 1\]. This model applies [@bib0003], and more importantly, the COVID-19 outbreak is introduced to investigate the asset-liability matching management. The liability is specified as a profit-sharing policy including a guaranteed interest rate and participation in the terminal surplus. Insurer investment is core to the provision of profit-sharing policies. Accordingly, risks faced by insurers include investment risk, underwriting risk, and mismatch risk, which provide crucial information about the default probability that concerns insurers and regulators. We argue that the accounting approach does not take into account the risk information above. Insurance Europe (2014) further indicates that insurance liabilities are generally illiquid such as annuities entail predictable payments to policyholders; thus, insurance liabilities are a contingent rather than an unconditional claim. This is the reason why we develop a contingent claim model to evaluate the market value of the insurer\'s equity. Toward that end, we apply [@bib0003], and more importantly, the COVID-19 outbreak is introduced to investigate the asset-liability matching management. Technically speaking, the volatility of the underlying assets of the insurer reveals information about the equity risk in the call option valuation that we focus on.

We suppose that *A* = *L* + *E* = (1 − α)*A* + α*A* is the balance sheet where (1 − α) is the insurer\'s leverage.[1](#cit_1){ref-type="fn"} Accordingly, the market value of the underlying assets follows a geometric Brownian motion:$$d\Pi = \mu\Pi dt + \left\lbrack {\sigma + \left( {v + \left( {\phi v^{2}/2} \right)} \right)} \right\rbrack\Pi d\Omega$$where Π = (1 + *R~A~*)*A*, where *R~A~* is the risky asset-market rate, is the asset value with the expected return μ \> 0, and the structural break in volatility \[σ + (*v* + (φ*v* ^2^/2))\] \> 0 in the spirit of [@bib0008] where σ is the expected volatility without the COVID-19 occurrence, *v* is the initial occurrence of the COVID-19 outbreak and φ is the degree of influencing the insurer. The parameter (*v* + (φ*v* ^2^/2)) \> 0 is an impact factor of the COVID-19 outbreak, which, for simplicity, creates only a positive impact on the expected volatility.[2](#cit_2){ref-type="fn"} This form also measures the seriousness degree φ of the COVID-19 to influence the insurer. Ω is a standard Wiener process.

In the profit-sharing policy, we denote by Θ = (1 − α)*Ae^R^*, where *R* is the guaranteed interest rate set by the insurer ([@bib0010]). The book value of the liabilities plays as a strike price of the call option since the market value of the insurer\'s equity can be thought of as a call option on Π. The market value of the equity π(Π, Θ) will then be given by the formula of [@bib0003] for the call options :[3](#cit_3){ref-type="fn"} $$\pi\left( \Pi,\Theta \right) = \left\lbrack \Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right) \right\rbrack - \delta\left\lbrack \left( 1 - \alpha \right)\Pi N\left( d_{3} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{4} \right) \right\rbrack$$where

*N*( • ) = the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution and where δ is the participation level, and *R~B~* is the security-market rate where the condition *R* \< *R~B~* \< *R~A~* is held. The difference between *R~B~* and *R* is interpreted as the insurance compensation while the difference between *R~A~* and *R~B~* is interpreted as the investment risk compensation. [Eq. (2)](#eqn0002){ref-type="disp-formula"} demonstrates a long call on Π with the strike price Θ and a short call offsetting exactly the bouns call of the policyholders.

Next, we apply [@bib0006] by assuming the board\'s preference as a utility function that positively weights equity but negatively wights equity risk :[4](#cit_4){ref-type="fn"} $$U = \left( 1 - P \right)\pi + P\left( - \pi_{\sigma} \right)$$

[Eq. (3)](#eqn0003){ref-type="disp-formula"} consists of the weight-average net positive equity (1 − *P*)π and the weight-average net negative equity risk *P*( − σ~π~) where *P* is the default probability ([@bib0012]) and σ~π~ is the equity risk, that is the instantaneous standard deviations of the return on π ([@bib0011]). The first term can be interpreted as the board\'s like captured by the net real equity return and the second term can be interpreted as the board\'s dislike captured by the net real equity risk due to the default probability is explicitly expressed in the board utility function.

3. Solution and comparative statics {#sec0003}
===================================

Differentiating [Eq. (2)](#eqn0002){ref-type="disp-formula"} with respect to *R*, the first-order condition is ∂π(Π, Θ)/∂*R* = 0 where the optimal *R* is determined. The second-order condition ∂^2^π(Π,Θ)/∂*R* ^2^ \< 0 is satisfied. Next, differentiating the optimal *R* with respect to *i* ( = φ and α) yields:$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial i} = - \frac{\partial^{2}\pi}{\partial R\partial i}/\frac{\partial^{2}\pi}{\partial R^{2}}$$

Besides, differentiation of [Eq. (3)](#eqn0003){ref-type="disp-formula"} evaluated at the optimal *R* with respect to *i* is given by:$$\frac{dU}{di} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial i} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial R}\frac{\partial R}{\partial i}$$where the first-term is the direct effect, which is the effect of the parameter *i* on *U*, holding the optimal *R* constant. The second term is the indirect effect, which is the effect of the parameter *i* on *U* through the adjustments of the optimal *R*. To investigate [Eqs. (4)](#eqn0004){ref-type="disp-formula"} and [(5)](#eqn0005){ref-type="disp-formula"}, we adopt a numerical approach to provide intuition.

Numerical analyses are based on the following reasonable parameter baselines. The parameter values, unless stated otherwise, are assumed as follows. (i) Let (*R*(%),  *L*) illustrate increasing from (2.75, 307), (3.00, 323), ... (4.00, 347) to (4.25, 348). (ii) The participation level δ = 0.85 and capital regulation α = 0.08. (iii) We assume that *R~A~* = 6.00% and *R~B~* = 4.50%, and the condition *R* \< *R~B~* \< *R~A~* is held for our analysis. (iv) We assume σ = 0.30, *v* = 0.20, and μ = 0.30.

[Table 1](#tbl0001){ref-type="table"} shows that an increase in the degree of the COVID-19 outbreak increases the life insurance policy businesses at an increased optimal guaranteed rate. Intuitively, as the seriousness of the COVID-19 has a significant impact on the investment risk, the insurer must now provide a return to a higher risk base. One way the insurer may attempt to augment its total returns is by increasing life insurance policies at an increased optimal guarantee rate for the asset-liability matching management purpose. Our result is in large supported by [@bib0009] although who remain silent on the optimal guaranteed rate determination.Table 1Effect of the seriousness level of COVID-19 outbreak on the optimal guaranteed rate.Table 1(*R*(%),  *L*)φ(2.75, 307)(3.00, 323)(3.25, 334)(3.50, 341)(3.75, 345)(4.00, 347)(4.25, 348)∂*R*/∂φ (10^−2^)0.03→0.05--2.12241.89291.69871.60351.9253--0.05→0.07--2.12131.89181.69771.60251.9238--0.07→0.09--2.12021.89081.69671.60141.9223--0.09→0.11--2.11911.88981.69571.60041.9208--0.11→0.13--2.11801.88871.69471.59931.9193--0.13→0.15--2.11691.88771.69371.59831.9179--[^1]

[Table 2](#tbl0002){ref-type="table"} presents that an increase in capital regulation increases the life insurance policies at an increased optimal guaranteed rate. An increase in capital regulation implies a decrease in the insurer\'s leverage, leading to investment funds decreased. To keep sufficient funds for investment, the insurer will conduct its guaranteed rate-setting strategy to increase its life insurance contracts. Thus, policyholder protection increases at the cost of the decreased optimal insurer interest margin due to an increase in the guaranteed rate. Thereby, stringent capital regulation helps policyholder protection but harms the insurer\'s interest margin, contributing to insurance stability during the COVID-19 outbreak period. [@bib0001] reports that the Bank of England rolls out stimulus measures on March 11, 2020, mainly lowering capital requirements for U.K. financial institutions, which is money kept in reserve to increase institutions' resistance to global COVID-19 shocks. This bailout allows nearly \$390 billion in new lending investment. However, our result is different because the insurer can use its pricing strategy by increasing the optimal guaranteed rate to attract insurance businesses and thus funds available for investment are increased. Therefore, our result further complements and provides choices for the financial authorities: capital regulation to the insurer reaching the goal of policyholder protection and capital deregulation to the insurer achieving the goal of the profit maximization when the COVID-19 outbreak is considered.Table 2Effect of capital regulation on the optimal guaranteed rate.Table 2(*R*(%),  *L*)α(2.75, 307)(3.00, 323)(3.25, 334)(3.50, 341)(3.75, 345)(4.00, 347)(4.25, 348)∂*R*/∂α0.08→0.10--2.26131.90581.55091.20320.8956--0.10→0.12--2.27451.92061.56881.22800.9424--0.12→0.14--2.27701.92841.58401.25601.0052--0.14→0.16--2.26141.92351.59271.28601.0871--0.16→0.18--2.22101.90021.59031.31411.1849--0.18→0.20--2.15341.85561.57301.33521.2891--[^2]

[Table 3](#tbl0003){ref-type="table"} demonstrates that capital regulation enhances insurance businesses. The enhancement is reinforced when the COVID-19 outbreak becomes more serious. The serious COVID-19 harms the insurer\'s investment return. For the asset-liability matching management, the insurer will increase its optimal guaranteed rate to attract more policies to substitute the increased capital reserves. Thus, stringent capital regulation helps policyholder protection, thereby contributing to insurance stability.Table 3Effect of capital regulation on the optimal guaranteed rate at various levels of the COVID-19 outbreak\*.Table 3φΔα0.030.050.070.090.110.13∂*R*/∂α0.08→0.100.89560.89570.89570.89570.89580.89580.10→0.120.94240.94250.94260.94270.94280.94290.12→0.141.00521.00541.00561.00581.00601.00620.14→0.161.08711.08741.08771.08801.08831.08850.16→0.181.18491.18521.18551.18581.18611.18640.18→0.201.28911.28921.28941.28961.28981.2899[^3]

In [Table 4](#tbl0004){ref-type="table"} , we show that the more serious COVID-19 outbreak directly enhances the board\'s utility, holding the optimal guaranteed rate constant, since the increased equity risk is insufficient to offset the increased equity return. Moreover, an increase in the COVID-19 indirectly increases the board\'s utility through optimal guaranteed-rate adjustments. The positive direct effect is mainly from the explicit consideration of equity return and risk, while the positive indirect effect considers the optimal guaranteed-rate adjustments. The indirect effect reinforces the direct effect, leading to a positive effect on the board\'s utility. In the setting of the board utility, conflicts of incentives between the manager and the board disappear. Accordingly, our result in large consistent with the argument of [@bib0009]: the life insurance business is one of the new opportunities during the COVID-19 period, implicitly implying that the board\'s utility is increased.Table 4Effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on the insurer\'s board utility.Table 4(*R*(%),  *L*)φ(2.75, 307)(3.00, 323)(3.25, 334)(3.50, 341)(3.75, 345)(4.00, 347)(4.25, 348)*dU*/*d*φ0.03→0.05--4.94174.89474.86224.84404.8480--0.05→0.07--4.93944.89234.85964.84144.8453--0.07→0.09--4.93724.88994.85714.83884.8426--0.09→0.11--4.93504.88754.85464.83624.8400--0.11→0.13--4.93284.88514.85214.83364.8373--0.13→0.15--4.93054.88274.84954.83094.8347--[^4]

In [Table 5](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"} , we show that capital regulation enhances the board\'s utility due to the safety net provided to the insurer and thus its board\'s utility can be improved by requiring the insurer to operate with more capital during the COVID-19 outbreak. The result thereby contributes to insurance stability since insurer capital serves directly for policyholder protection ([@bib0007]). As reported by [@bib0005], the COVID-19 outbreak has been a primary driver of recent market volatility. Insurance is considered a transfer of risks from the insured to the insurer. It must have a level of capital, which enables it to absorb unfavorable risks and to be solvent ([@bib0002]). Our result encompasses the suggestion of [@bib0002] since the guaranteed rate-setting behavior during the COVID-19 outbreak period is explicitly considered.Table 5Effect of capital regulation on the insurer\'s board utility.Table 5(*R*(%),  *L*)α(2.75, 307)(3.00, 323)(3.25, 334)(3.50, 341)(3.75, 345)(4.00, 347)(4.25, 348)*dU*/*d*α0.08→0.10--93.152365.024844.829231.606324.7556--0.10→0.12--123.278595.989576.316663.298156.2838--0.12→0.14--153.2195126.8674107.804095.081188.0360--0.14→0.16--180.9011155.6453137.3245125.0219118.1036--0.16→0.18--204.2004180.2381162.8209151.0818144.4540--0.18→0.20--221.6185199.1444182.7882171.7484165.5548--[^5]

In [Table 6](#tbl0006){ref-type="table"} , we describe that stringent capital regulation reduces the positive effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on the board\'s utility. As the insurer is increasingly forced to increase its capital relative to the life insurance policy, it must increasingly provide a return to a larger equity base, yielding the board\'s utility increasingly. Our result is in large consistent with [@bib0013]: policy responses may create further uncertainty in financial \[insurance\] markets.Table 6Effect of capital regulation on the insurer\'s board utility at various levels of the COVID-19 outbreak\*.Table 6φΔα0.030.050.070.090.110.13*dU*/*d*α~0.08→0.10~24.755624.640024.524624.409524.294724.18020.10→0.1256.283856.125055.966455.808155.649955.49190.12→0.1488.036087.815987.595887.375787.155686.93560.14→0.16118.1036117.7996117.4955117.1912116.8868116.58210.16→0.18144.4540144.0468143.6392143.2313142.8232142.41470.18→0.20165.5548165.0354164.5157163.9957163.4755162.9549[^6]

4. Conclusion {#sec0004}
=============

This paper proposes to explore the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak and capital regulation on the insurer\'s interest margin and its board utility. Results suggest that the COVID-19 outbreak and capital regulation increase insurance businesses at increased optimal guaranteed rates and enhance the board\'s utility. One immediate application reveals the conflicts of incentives between the insurer and its board since an increase in the board utility at the cost of the insurer\'s liabilities from the standpoint of insurer profitability. The model presented here is relatively fairly and should open at least one further avenue of research. An immediate outgrowth of the model is to introduce reinsurance options, particularly during the unexpected period of the COVID-19 outbreak. This is because the COVID-19 event has been a primary driver of market volatility. In conclusion, it is shown that guaranteed rate-setting behavior mode and capital regulation are intimately relevant to the COVID-19 outbreak.
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Appendix {#sec0007}
========

Appendix 1:

We support that the policyholders whose premium payments at *t* = 0 is denoted by *L* = (1 − α)*A* where α ∈ (0, 1), and the equity holders whose equity capital at *t* = 0 is denoted by *E* = α*A*. (1 − α) captures leverage while α captures capital regulation.

Appendix 2:$$d_{1} = \frac{1}{\sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)}\left( \ln\frac{\Pi}{\Theta} + R_{B} + \frac{\left\lbrack \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right) \right\rbrack^{2}}{2} \right)$$ $$d_{2} = d_{1} - \left\lbrack \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)\rbrack \right.$$ $$d_{3} = \frac{1}{\sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)}\left( \ln\frac{\alpha\Pi}{\Theta} + R_{B} + \frac{\left\lbrack \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right) \right\rbrack^{2}}{2} \right)$$ $$d_{4} = d_{3} - \left\lbrack \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)\rbrack \right.$$

Appendix 3:$$P = \frac{\Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}}{\pi}N\left( {- f_{1}} \right) + \frac{\delta\left\lbrack {\left( 1 - \alpha \right)\Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}} \right\rbrack}{\pi}N\left( {- f_{2}} \right)$$ $$f_{1} = \frac{1}{\sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)}\left( {\ln\frac{\Pi}{\Theta} + \mu - \frac{\left( \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right) \right)^{2}}{2}} \right)$$ $$f_{2} = \frac{1}{\sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)}\left\lbrack {\ln\frac{\left( 1 - \alpha \right)\Pi}{\Theta} + \mu - \frac{\left( \sigma + \left( v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right) \right)^{2}}{2}} \right\rbrack$$ $$\begin{matrix}
 & {\pi_{\sigma} = \left( \sigma + v + \left( \phi v^{2}/2 \right) \right)} \\
 & \left\lbrack \begin{array}{l}
{\frac{\Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right)}{\pi}\frac{\partial\left( \Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right) \right)}{\partial\Pi}\frac{\Pi}{\Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right)}} \\
{+ \frac{\delta\left( \Pi\left( 1 - \alpha \right)N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right) \right)}{\pi}\frac{\partial\delta\left( \left( \Pi\left( 1 - \alpha \right)N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right) \right) \right.}{\partial\alpha\Pi}} \\
\frac{\alpha\Pi}{\left( \delta\left( 1 - \alpha \right)\Pi N\left( d_{1} \right) - \Theta e^{- R_{B}}N\left( d_{2} \right) \right)} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack \\
\end{matrix}$$

Appendix B. Supplementary materials {#sec0006}
===================================

Image, application 1

For the derivation of the balance sheet, see Appendix 1.

It is also recognized that the expected return is influenced by the COVID-19. We are silent on this influence for simplicity. The qualitative results derived from the model are expected to remain unchanged when we add this complexicity.

For the specifications of *d*~1~ \~ *d*~4~, see Appendix 2

For specifications of *P* and π~σ~, see Appendix 3

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at [doi:10.1016/j.frl.2020.101659](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101659){#interref0001}.

[^1]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00%, *R~B~* = 4.50%, α = 0.08, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. The shaded areas represent the values evaluated at the optimal *R* = 4.00%.

[^2]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00% *R~B~* = 4.50%, φ = 0.03, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. The shaded areas represent the values evaluated at the optimal *R* = 4.00%.

[^3]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00% *R~B~* = 4.50%, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, (*R*(%),  *L*) = (4.00, 347), μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. All values are evaluated at the optimal guaranteed rates.

[^4]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00%, *R~B~* = 4.50%, α = 0.08, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. The board utility is evaluated at the optimal *R* = 4.00%. Both the direct and indirect effects are positive.

[^5]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00% *R~B~* = 4.50%, φ = 0.03, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. The board utility is evaluated at the optimal *R* = 4.00% obtained from [Table 2](#tbl0002){ref-type="table"}. Both the direct and indirect effects are positive.

[^6]: \*Parameter values, unless stated otherwise, *R~A~* = 6.00% *R~B~* = 4.50%, δ = 0.85, σ = 0.30, (*R*(%),  *L*) = (4.00, 347), μ = 0.30 and *v* = 0.20. All values are evaluated at the optimal guaranteed rate.
